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Introduction
The battle against opioid use disorder in the United States spans three centuries,
beginning when American physicians recorded widespread morphine addiction in the years
following the Civil War.1 Regulatory attempts to curb the opioid crisis began in the early
twentieth century, as did experimentation with—and stigmatization of—maintenance treatment.2
This crisis has worsened considerably over the last several decades. Since 1999, overdose deaths
from opioids have increased more than sixfold,3 claiming close to 500,000 American lives.4 This

1

Erick Trickey, Inside the Story of America’s 19th-Century Opiate Addiction, SMITHSONIAN

MAGAZINE (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/inside-story-americas-19thcentury-opiate-addiction-180967673/ (delineating the many evolutions of the opioid crisis in the
United States from battlefield hospitals in the American Civil War and opium dens in San
Francisco to the rise of heroin use in the aftermath of World War II to the commercial
normalization of OxyContin in the early 2000s). See also Jonathan S. Jones, The “Great Risk”
of “Opium Eating”: How Civil War-Era Doctors Reacted to Prescription Opioid Addiction,
YALE UNIV. LIBR. (Dec. 1, 2020), https://library.medicine.yale.edu/blog/ (describing the rise of
opioid addiction in the wake of the American Civil War and the threat of addiction that
physicians began to understand at the time).
2

Trickey supra note 1.

3

Claire Felter, The U.S. Opioid Epidemic, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (last updated July

16, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-opioid-epidemic.
4

Data Analysis and Resources, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (last reviewed

March 10, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/analysis.html.
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is a consequence of three types of addictive opioid supply pools; prescription pills, heroin, and
synthetic opioids; forming what is commonly known as the “triple wave” of opioid mortality in
the United States.5
Today, more than two million Americans struggle with opioid use disorder (OUD).6 An
estimated 8-12% of chronic pain opioid users develop OUD.7 Opioid prescriptions peaked in

5

The first wave, opioid prescription pills, began to rise in the 1990s; heroin is recognized to have

risen in the mid-2000s; the third wave, synthetic opioids, flooded into the United States from
China and Mexico in the mid-2010s. A partial cause of the explosion of heroin use was the
insufficiency of prescription pills to appease the addictions of young heroin users, who instead
found that heroin could be obtained cheaply with relative ease.
Daniel Ciccarone, The Triple Wave Epidemic: Supply and Demand Drivers of the US Opioid
Overdose Crisis, 71 INT’L J. DRUG POLICY 183.
6

Opioid Addiction 2016 Facts & Figures, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF ADDICTION MEDICINE,

https://www.asam.org/docs/default-source/advocacy/opioid-addiction-disease-facts-figures.pdf
(noting, also, that as of 2015, 20.5 million Americans had some type of substance abuse
disorder). See also THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, THE UNDERESTIMATED COST OF THE
OPIOID CRISIS (Nov. 2017) (estimating the economic cost of the opioid crisis in the United States
to be approximately $504 billion).
7

Opioid Overdose Crisis, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE (March 11, 2021),

https://www.drugabuse.gov/drug-topics/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis. See also Oesterle, et al.,
Medication-Assisted Treatment for Opioid-Use Disorder, MAYO CLINIC,

2

2012 and declined between 2014 and 2019,8 falling 37.1%.9 In large part, this resulted from
increased education and regulation surrounding the use of opioid analgesics to treat pain.10
However, opioid overdose deaths did not decline accordingly.11 From 2013 to 2019, deaths from
synthetic opioids increased twelvefold despite tightened regulation of opioid prescriptions and
falling rates of prescription opioid deaths.12 The illicit market willingly supplied what
pharmacists and doctors would not, or could not, provide.13 This reality, and the realities of

https://www.mayoclinicproceedings.org/article/S0025-6196(19)30393-3/pdf (stating that 30% of
patients prescribed opioids misuse them).
8

U.S. Opioid Dispensing Rate Maps, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (last

reviewed Dec. 7, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/maps/rxrate-maps.html.
9

American Medical Association, Physicians’ Progress Toward Ending the Nation’s Drug

Overdose and Death Epidemic (2020), https://www.ama-assn.org/system/files/2020-07/opioidtask-force-progress-report.pdf.
10

See, e.g., BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45164, LEGAL AUTHORITIES UNDER THE

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT TO COMBAT THE OPIOID CRISIS 29 (2018).
11

Data Analysis and Resources, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (last

reviewed March 10, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/analysis.html.
12

Tighter Regulation Lowers Targeted, but Not Overall, Opioid Use, NATIONAL BUREAU OF

ECONOMIC RESEARCH (Nov. 2020), https://www.nber.org/bh/tighter-regulation-lowers-targetednot-overall-opioid-use; Daniel Ciccarone, The Rise of Illicit Fentanyls, Stimulants and the
Fourth Wave of the Opioid Crisis, 34 CURRENT OPINION IN PSYCHIATRY 344.
13

Ciccarone, supra note 12.

3

addiction, remain today. Illicit opioids have never been as prevalent in the United States as they
are now.
Recently, federal and state institutions have brought lawsuits against major corporations
for their respective roles in perpetuating the opioid crisis.14 However, in the midst of the “third
wave” of the opioid crisis, the greatest cause of opioid-related death is consumption of synthetic
opioids, namely fentanyl. In 2019, fentanyl and other synthetic opioids were involved in 72.9%
of all drug overdoses in the United States.15
To date, there are three FDA-approved medications used for medically assisted treatment
(MAT) of OUD: methadone, buprenorphine, and naltrexone. Methadone is a Schedule II
substance and a full opioid agonist without the euphoric effects of other opioid drugs. It is also
the most strictly regulated of all three substances; methadone must be dispensed at an opioid

14

See Jan Hoffman, Drug Distributors and J.&J. Reach $26 Billion Deal to End Opioid

Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/21/health/opioidsdistributors-settlement.html; Michael Balsamo & Anne D’Innocenzio, Feds Sue Walmart Over
Role in Opioid Crisis, AP NEWS (Dec. 22, 2020); Jan Hoffman, 15 States Reach a Deal With
Purdue Pharma, Advancing a $4.5 Billion Opioid Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (published July 8,
2021, updated July 10, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/08/health/purdue-pharmaopioids-settlement.html; OFF. OF THE DEPUTY ATT’Y GEN., PRESS RELEASE 10-1282, OPIOID
MANUFACTURER PURDUE PHARMA PLEADS GUILTY TO FRAUD AND KICKBACK CONSPIRACIES
(Nov. 24, 2020).
15

Drug Overdose Deaths Remain High, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (last

reviewed March 3, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/deaths/index.html.

4

treatment program (OTP).16 Buprenorphine, a Schedule III substance and partial opioid agonist,
must also be administered by an OTP, although certain medical practitioners may obtain special
waivers, also known as “X-waivers,” to prescribe and dispense the substance.17 Naltrexone is a
slow-release opioid antagonist while naloxone, also known as Narcan, it is a fast-acting opioid
antagonist used solely for detoxification. Both drugs can be prescribed by any licensed
physician to suspend the effects of opioids. Medically assisted treatment is highly effective in
diminishing cravings and ending the vicious cycle of opioid abuse.18
Compliance with MAT is the most effective predictor of successful recovery from
OUD.19 Unfortunately, OUD treatment disparities are severe. Only 21.5% of people with OUD

16

Information About Medication-Assisted Treatment (MAT), FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (current as

of Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/information-drug-class/information-aboutmedication-assisted-treatment-mat.
17

18

See infra part II(A).
Bertha K. Madras et al., Improving Access to Evidence Based Medical Treatment for Opioid

Used Disorder: Strategies to Address Key Barriers Within the Treatment System, NAT’L
ACADEMY OF MEDICINE, https://nam.edu/improving-access-to-evidence-based-medicaltreatment-for-opioid-use-disorder-strategies-to-address-key-barriers-within-the-treatmentsystem/.
19

Medications for Opioid Use Disorder Improve Patient Outcomes, THE PEW CHARITABLE

TRUSTS (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/factsheets/2020/12/medications-for-opioid-use-disorder-improve-patient-outcomes.

5

underwent treatment from 2009 to 2013.20 As of 2021, the U.S. has approximately 1,800 opioid
treatment programs, meaning that the ratio of opioid addicts to treatment programs is more than
one thousand to one.21
In the spring of 2020, COVID-19 reached the United States and spread rapidly in densely
populated, urban areas, eventually claiming hundreds of thousands of American lives. Every
state and territory closed its public schools and imposed restrictions on social gatherings; most
forced “non-essential” commercial enterprises to close.22 The workforce that once boasted an

20

Brendan Saloner, & Shankar Karthikeyan, Changes in Substance Abuse Treatment Use Among

Individuals with Opioid Use Disorders in the United States, 2004–2013, 314 JAMA 1515;
JONATHAN H. DUFF, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45279, BUPRENORPHINE AND THE OPIOID CRISIS: A
PRIMER FOR CONGRESS 2 (2018) (stating that as of 2015, only eighteen percent of those in need
of MAT received it); see NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, MEDICATIONS TO TREAT OPIOID USE
DISORDER RESEARCH REPORT 14, https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/researchreports/medications-to-treat-opioid-addiction/overview; Utsha Khatri et al., These Key
Telehealth Policy Changes Would Improve Buprenorphine Access While Advancing Health
Equity, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Sep. 11, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/ . See also
Barriers to Addiction Treatment: Why Addicts Don’t Seek Help, AM. ADDICTION CENTERS (last
updated May 28, 2021), https://americanaddictioncenters.org/rehab-guide/treatment-barriers.
21

Opioid Treatment Programs: A Key Treatment System Component, PEW TRUSTS (July 16,

2021), https://www.pewtrusts.org/; supra note 6.
22

See Reopening Plans and Mask Mandates for All 50 States, N.Y. TIMES (last updated July 1,

2021), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/states-reopen-map-coronavirus.html.
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unemployment rate of 3.5% suddenly grappled with an unemployment rate of 14.8%.23 Fear,
despair, and isolation swept across the nation and further exacerbated a myriad of already
detrimental physical, mental, and behavioral health epidemics.24 Access to healthcare became
restricted as many hospitals were overwhelmed by the sheer volume of infected persons and
practitioners employed social distancing measures to avoid spread of the virus.25
The pandemic’s impact on opioid use disorder and overdose deaths has been especially
devastating. The number of overdose deaths rose 27% to 88,295 from September 2019 to
August 2020. 26 The provisional drug overdose death count for 2020 is close to 90,000, with
opioid-related deaths comprising 70-75% of these deaths.27
Throughout the pandemic, the U.S. government implemented a number of emergency

23

FALK, ET AL., CONG. RSCH SERV., R46554, UNEMPLOYMENT DURING THE COVID-19

PANDEMIC 2, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R46554.pdf.
24

Mason Marks, Controlled Substance Regulation for the COVID-19 Mental Health Crisis, 72

ADMIN. L. REV 649, 716 (2020) (citing William Wan & Heather Long, ‘Cries for Help’: Drug
Overdoses Are Soaring During the Coronavirus Pandemic, WASH. POST (July 1, 2020)).
25

Robinson Meyer & Alexis Madrigal, The U.S. Has Passed the Hospital Breaking Point, THE

ATLANTIC (Dec. 4, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/.
26

Jesse C. Baumgartner & David C. Radley, The Spike in Drug Overdose Deaths During the

COVID-19 Pandemic and Policy Options to Move Forward, TO THE POINT (Mar. 25, 2021),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2021/spike-drug-overdose-deaths-during-covid-19pandemic-and-policy-options-move-forward.
27

Id.
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actions aimed at furthering efforts to combat the intensifying opioid crisis. Some of these
changes may represent potential shifts in the landscape of the opioid crisis. In May 2021,
President Biden signed a congressional act to extend an emergency scheduling order—originally
enacted by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in 2018 and extended, for the first time in
2020—that maintained Schedule I status for fentanyl analogues under the Controlled Substances
Act until October 2021.28 Some fentanyl analogues are designed with minor structural changes
intended specifically to circumvent the law,29 and the temporary scheduling order has effectively
prevented this.30 Congress has hesitated to permanently enact the order.31
This supply-side action came in tandem with an increased focus on deregulation of MAT.
In April 2021, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued guidance that
removed training and certification requirements typically required for medical practitioners
outside of an opioid treatment program (OTP) to prescribe and dispense buprenorphine. In
response to the limitations on in-person healthcare services, HHS enacted other emergency
measures to expand use of telemedicine to administer MAT. Specifically, qualified practitioners
were permitted to initiate buprenorphine treatment without an in-person evaluation and prescribe

28

See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11.

29

KRISTIN M. TENNYSON, ET AL., U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, FENTANYL AND FENTANYL

ANALOGUES: FEDERAL TRENDS AND TRAFFICKING PATTERNS 7 (Jan. 2021).
30

The Countdown: Fentanyl Analogues & the Expiring Emergency Scheduling Order: Hearing

Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 3 (2019) (statement of Ms. Amanda
Liskamm, Director of Opioid Enforcement and Prevention Efforts, U.S. Department of Justice).
31

Id.

8

buprenorphine and methadone for those patients already receiving the substances.32 In addition,
HHS published guidance for states granting permission for OTPs to issue twenty-eight days of
take-home methadone and buprenorphine to patients considered “stable.” 33
The Attorney General’s decision to temporarily schedule fentanyl-related substances,
while effective in preventing the development and trafficking of new fentanyl analogues,
diminishes the integrity of the drug scheduling process and creates unforeseen consequences for
criminal justice. The DEA should expand opportunities for researchers to study fentanyl
analogues so they can be properly scheduled in accordance with the Controlled Substances Act
using a defensible methodology that promotes trust between the government, the American
people, and the scientific community.
Efforts to regulate the supply side of the opioid epidemic will be fruitless if the demand
of opioid addiction continues to grow and illicit fentanyl is more accessible than medically
assisted treatments. The DEA should maintain its emergency removal of the X-waiver
requirements for buprenorphine and reexamine the inflexibility of the opioid treatment program

32

Letter from Thomas W. Prevoznik, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Diversion Control

Division, Drug Enforcement Agency, 2 (March 31, 2020); SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL
HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN., FAQS: PROVISION OF METHADONE AND BUPRENORPHINE FOR THE
TREATMENT OF OPIOID USE DISORDER IN THE COVID-19 EMERGENCY (April 21, 2020),
https://www.samhsa.gov/sites/default/files/faqs-for-oud-prescribing-and-dispensing.pdf.
33

See Letter from Thomas W. Prevoznik, supra note 32, at 2 (March 31, 2020) (describing the

emergency allowances for prescription of buprenorphine following a telephone call or video
conference where an in-person evaluation would generally be required).

9

requirement. DEA and HHS should permanently preserve emergency measures expanding
access to telemedical OUD treatment and prescription, granting discretion to physicians to treat
their patients as they see fit to improve access for OUD patients otherwise limited by disability,
lacking transportation access, or unable to meet the transaction costs of in-person visits.
Part I of this Comment discusses the temporary class scheduling of fentanyl analogues,
its effectiveness, and its implications. Part II explores the operative removal of the X-waiver
requirement during the pandemic and DEA’s stringent requirements for opioid treatment
programs. Part III of this Comment analyzes the emergency expansion of telemedicine and its
impact on addressing OUD treatment disparities. Part IV addresses several administrative
courses of action that DEA, HHS, and FDA might take to address the supply and demand
components of the opioid crisis.
I.

Temporary Class-Wide Scheduling of Fentanyl
Rates of opioid use disorder and overdose death correlate strongly with supply,34 and

over the last several decades, the federal government has made many attempts to reduce the
supply of opiate drugs available to the public. In 2018, the DEA temporarily placed all fentanyl
analogues into Schedule I. In April 2021, Congress extended the temporary order until October
2021.35
The HHS, Substance Abuse Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), the

34

See generally Bryce Pardo, et al., The Synthetic Opioid Surge in the United States: Insights

from Mortality and Seizure Data, RAND CORPORATION 3 (discussing supply-side indicators in the
synthetic opioid market and their relationship to overdose rates).
35

Pub. L. No. 115-114, 135 Stat. 264.

10

FDA, the DOJ, and the DEA are responsible for regulating controlled substances and enforcing
the law. The FDA determines whether prescription drugs are safe and effective for their
proposed use under the Controlled Substance Act of 1970 (CSA).36 The FDA also determines
whether certain substances have abuse potential such that they threaten public health. Such
substances are regulated as “controlled substances” and placed into five different “schedules.”37
Schedule I substances are those ruled to have no accepted medical use and high abuse potential;
schedule II substances have high potential for abuse, but some medical utility; schedule III
substances carry a lesser, but significant, risk of abuse and psychological dependance; and
substances in schedules IV and V are purported to have low risk of abuse.38 The drug scheduling
process balances the interests of preventing abuse and addiction while recognizing the medical
utility of certain controlled substances.
Fentanyl is a schedule II substance.39 It is 50 times more powerful than heroin and 100
times more potent than morphine, and it only takes two milligrams of fentanyl to result in an
overdose fatality.40 As a full opioid agonist, fentanyl binds tightly to µ (mu) opioid receptors in

36

21 U.S.C. § 301.

37

21 C.F.R. §§ 1308.11-15; 21 U.S.C. § 802-12.

38

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE SCHEDULES, DEA, DIVERSION CONTROL DIV.,

https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/schedules/.
39

21 C.F.R. §§ 1308.11-15; 21 U.S.C. § 812.

40

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-21-499, SYNTHETIC OPIOIDS: CONSIDERATIONS FOR

THE CLASS-WIDE SCHEDULING OF FENTANYL-RELATED SUBSTANCES

11

10 (2021).

the brain and inhibits neuronal pain signals.41 Fentanyl can depress the nervous system within
minutes, making it incredibly powerful in treating breakthrough pain.42 Where pain is not
present, this neurobiological reward system induces pleasure that can encourage repeated use and
cause dependence.43 High fentanyl plasma concentration can cause fatal respiratory
depression.44 Fentanyl’s schedule II designation recognizes its ability to meet the legitimate
needs of chronic pain and cancer patients.45
Synthetic opioids are commonly consumed as counterfeit prescription pills containing
lethal doses of fentanyl and fentanyl analogues sold illegally to unknowing users.46 Just as

41

Jeffery Fudin, Opioid Agonists, Partial Agonists, Antagonists: Oh My!, PHARMACY TIMES

(Jan. 6, 2018), https://www.pharmacytimes.com/view/opioid-agonists-partial-agonistsantagonists-oh-my.
42

Unlike other opioids, fentanyl can be administered in transmucosal fashion in the form of a

film, spray, or patch. Theodore H. Stanley, The Fentanyl Story, 15 JOURNAL OF PAIN 1215, 121719 (Dec. 2014).
43

Kosten & George, The Neurobiology of Opioid Dependence: Implications for Treatment, 1

SCI. PRAC. PERSP. 13, 14.
44

Id. at 1223.

45

Pat Anson, How Opioid Hysteria Affects Cancer Patients, PAIN NEWS NETWORK (May 25,

2021), https://www.painnewsnetwork.org/stories/2021/5/25/how-opioid-hysteria-affects-cancerpatients; see also Stanley, supra note 42.
46

Data Analysis and Resources, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (last

reviewed March 10, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/analysis.html. China is the

12

heroin was cheaper for addicts to obtain than prescription opioids in the early 2000s, and thus
replaced the prescription drugs, fentanyl is cheaper and easier to obtain than both prescription
opioids and heroin and has become the leading cause of opioid-related death.47 Rates of opioid
abuse have not increased drastically, but the introduction of fentanyl into the supply has made
opioid abuse much more lethal than in previous years.48 Scheduling determinations are typically
made on an individual basis by a notice-and-comment rulemaking process that can take months
to several years, so federal agencies cannot schedule the hundreds of different fentanyl analogues
fast enough to be able to prosecute their manufacturers.49
A. Legislative Background
The Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914 was the first deliberate attempt to regulate opiate

largest manufacturer and exporter of the illicit fentanyl that is distributed in the United States.
DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, DEA-DCT-DIR-009-20, FENTANYL FLOW TO THE UNITED
STATES 2-3 (Jan. 2020); LIANA W. ROSEN & SUSAN V. LAWRENCE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10890,
ILLICIT FENTANYL AND CHINA’S ROLE (updated Jan. 29, 2021). See Daniel Ciccarone, Fentanyl
in the U.S. Heroin Supply: A Rapidly Changing Risk Environment, 46 INT’L J. OF DRUG POLICY
107, 108 (describing the “positive supply shock” of synthetic opioids that began in 2013).
47

Pardo, et al., Understanding America’s Surge in Fentanyl and Other Synthetic Opioids, RAND

CORPORATION 3 (2019), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB10091.html. See also
Vanda Felbab-Brown, Fentanyl and Geopolitics: Controlling Opioid Supply from China,
BROOKINGS INST. 1, 5.
48

Id.

49

Schwartzapfel infra note 91.

13

substances in response to rising rates of addiction.50 A 1919 Supreme Court case determined that
under the Harrison Narcotics Act, maintenance treatment, or the practice of using addictive
substances to treat addicts, violated the law.51
Today, the CSA provides the statutory authority for DEA to make “schedule”
determinations for drugs; it regulates the manufacture, possession, use, prescription, distribution,
and import of substances.52 Certain CSA provisions control industry registration. These
provisions require manufacturers, distributors, pharmaceutical companies, hospitals, pharmacies,
and other practitioners to register with the DEA annually or triennially to manufacture or
distribute controlled substances.53 The registrations specify the extent of authorized engagement

50

Samuel B. Waterman, The Harrison Act and Medical Practice, 25 GUILD PRAC. 1 (1966); see

David T. Courtwright, Preventing and Treating Narcotic Addiction—A Century of Federal Drug
Control, NEW ENGLAND J. OF MEDICINE (Nov. 26, 2015),
https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1508818; see also C. E. Terry, The Harrison
Anti-Narcotic Act, 5 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 518 (criticizing the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act for
failing to impose more severe restrictions of the prescription of opium, calling the physician “the
greatest single factor in drug addict formation”).
51

See Scott, The Pleasure Principle: A Critical Examination of Federal Scheduling of

Controlled Substances, 29 Sw. U. L. REV. 447, 455 (2000) (citing Webb v. United States, 249
U.S. 96, 99-100 (1919)).
52

21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971. H.R. REP. No. 91-1444 (1970); id. (citing Touby v. United States, 500

U.S. 160 (1991)).
53

21 U.S.C. § 821-32.
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and include a multitude of obligations.54 Other CSA provisions delineate trafficking regulations,
including production, distribution, and possession offenses and penalties.55
A controlled substance can be scheduled, rescheduled, or removed from schedule control
by an administrative process or by an act of Congress.56 The legislative process for scheduling
substances is far more direct.57 The DEA’s schedule determinations are contingent on medical
and scientific evaluations by the HHS Secretary who delegates the responsibility of performing
these evaluations to the FDA.58 The basic criteria for scheduling are also known as the “Eight
Factor Analysis.”59 The FDA’s schedule recommendations are binding, but the DEA has
discretion to implement the recommendation.60 DEA drug scheduling is subject to the notice-

54

21 U.S.C. § 821-32.

55

21 U.S.C. § 841-90.

56

See JOANNA R. LAMPE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45948, THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT

(CSA): A LEGAL OVERVIEW FOR THE 117TH CONGRESS 8 (2019).
57

Id. at 2.

58

21 U.S.C. § 811(a); 28 C.F.R. § 0.100(b).

59

21 U.S.C. § 811(c); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ASSESSMENT OF ABUSE POTENTIAL OF

DRUGS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 10-11 (2017). The eight factors specified in this subsection of
the CSA are, “[the substance’s] actual or relative potential for abuse;” “scientific evidence of its
pharmacological effect, if known; “the state of current scientific knowledge regarding the drug or
other substance;” “its history and current pattern of abuse;” “the scope, duration, and
significance of abuse;” and “what, if any, risk there is to the public health.”
60

See LAMPE, supra note 57, at 9.

15

and-comment rulemaking process.61 The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 created the
legal authority for the Attorney General, in certain circumstances, to issue emergency scheduling
orders.62
Scheduling impacts research of controlled substances. Researchers conducting studies on
controlled substances require approval from the FDA and DEA.63 Ironically, one of the factors
considered in FDA scheduling evaluations is, “the state of current scientific knowledge regarding
the drug.”64 These determinations require research that produces evidence that is widely
accepted by the scientific community.65 This is widely considered a gordian knot of drug
scheduling determinations: the lack of credible research surrounding a controlled substance can
prevent further research of the substance.66 However, because the entire class of fentanyl
analogues is controlled collectively, researchers may apply and obtain approval to study the
entire class of substances rather than having to submit applications on a substance-by-substance

61

Id.

62

Id. at 10.

63

21 U.S.C. § 823. See also Michael H. Andreae, et al., An ethical exploration of barriers to

research on controlled drugs, 16 AM J. BIOETHICS 36; JOANNA R. LAMPE, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
LSB10404, AN EXPIRATION DATE FOR TEMPORARY CONTROL OF FENTANYL ANALOGUES 2
(2021); Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991).
64

21 U.S.C. § 811(c).

65

21 U.S.C. § 811(c).

66

See generally Elena Quattrone, The “Catch-22” of Marijuana [Il]legalization, 22 BU J.

SCIENCE & TECH. L. 299.
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basis.67
B. Temporary Scheduling Authority
Section 202 of the CSA, or 21 U.S.C. 811(h), gives the U.S. Attorney General legal
authority to enact a temporary scheduling order.68 The legislative history of this statutory
authority demonstrates that Congress intended to prevent the development of new variations of
illicit psychotropic substances.69 In fact, the very first time the DEA issued an emergency
scheduling order in 1985, it used the authority to schedule 3-methylfentanyl.70 To justify its
decision, the DEA provided evidence of thirty-one overdose deaths that resulted from
consumption of the synthetic fentanyl analogue.71 Since then, the DEA has used this authority to
control other “designer drugs” like 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) analogues
and synthetic cannabinoids.72 In order to exercise this authority, the DEA must demonstrate that
the substance is an “imminent hazard” to public health and safety. 73 In making an emergency

67

Supra note 30 at 3l; supra note 40 at 17.

68

21 U.S.C. § 811(h); 21 C.F.R. § 1308.49 (2021).

69

Olivia Castillo, Kratom Crackdown: How DEA Abused Its Emergency Scheduling Authority

under the Controlled Substances Act, 72 U. MIAMI L. REV. 972, 996-97 (2018); see also Am.
Pharm. Ass'n v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 824, 830 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Am. Pharm.
Ass'n v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
70

Castillo, supra note 62, at 998.

71

Id. (citing 50 Fed. Reg. 11,690 (March 25, 1985)).

72

Id. at 998-1001.

73

21 U.S.C. § 811(h)(3).
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scheduling determination, the Attorney General is required to consider “actual abuse, diversion
from legitimate channels, and clandestine importation, manufacture, or distribution.”74
Temporary scheduling orders are not subject to judicial review and the substance may only be
rescheduled by legislative action.75 Generally, a temporary scheduling order will expire two
years after it is issued, but the Attorney General may further extend the order for another year
after this time.76
In February 2018, the DEA issued such an order on fentanyl and fentanyl analogues,
placing them in schedule I.77 Then, in February 2020, Congress voted to extend the order for
another year.78 In April 2021, Congress voted to extend the temporary scheduling order until

74

21 U.S.C. § 811(h)(3).

75

LAMPE, supra note 63, at 2; Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991). See also John

Hudack & Grace Wallace, How to Reschedule Marijuana and Why It’s Unlikely Anytime Soon,
THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Feb. 13, 2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2015/02/13/how-to-reschedule-marijuana-and-why-itsunlikely-anytime-soon.
76

21 U.S.C. § 811(h)(2).
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See LAMPE, supra note 56, at 2.

78

See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11(h) (stating, “The Administrator of the Drug Enforcement

Administration is issuing this temporary scheduling order to schedule fentanyl-related substances
that are not currently listed in any schedule of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and their
isomers, esters, ethers, salts and salts of isomers, esters, and ethers in schedule I”).
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October 2021.79 Congress expressed intent to use the order to “[deter] traffickers, manufacturers,
and those distributing [fentanyl analogues].”80 Congresswoman Cathy Rodgers acknowledged
that extending the temporary order amounted to “kicking the can down the road.”81
The DEA has the authority, apart from the temporary order, to control fentanyl analogues
under existing law.82 The 1986 Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act (Analogue
Act) provides the regulatory framework for control of controlled substance analogues.83 The
Analogue Act sets forth three criteria under which controlled substance analogues can be
controlled under the CSA; one that is chemically similar to a controlled substance; has a
“stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system that is substantially
similar to a controlled substance;” or which a person intends to have an effect on the central
nervous system that is substantially similar to a controlled substance.84 United States v. Forbes85
held that one substance is not substantially similar to another if it is not chemically similar,

79

Extending Temporary Emergency Scheduling of Fentanyl Analogues Act, Pub. L. No. 115-

114, 135 Stat. 264.
80

167 Cong. Rec. H2025, H2025 (April 21, 2021) (statement by Rep. Pallone of New Jersey).

81

Id. (statement by Rep. Rogers of Washington).

82

See 21 U.S.C. § 813.

83

Yandiel Muniz, Designer Drugs and the Federal Analog Act, FIU L. REV (Mar 11, 2017),

https://law.fiu.edu/2017/03/11/designer-drugs-federal-analog-act/.
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21 U.S.C. § 813; McFadden v. United States, 576 U.S. 186, 193-94 (2015) (clarifying the

knowledge standard for violating the Analogue Act).
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806 F. Supp. 232 (D. Colo. 1992).
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cannot be synthesized from the other, and it does not have the same or similar affects as the
other.86 In other words, the Analogue Act’s rule is conjunctive: the government must prove both
the chemical similarity and the physiological similarity of the substance to the controlled
substance.87 Under the temporary order, Schedule I includes a definition of “fentanyl-related
substance[s]” that includes a non-exclusive list of several types of structural modifications that
might qualify. 88
C. Predicted Outcomes of Class-Wide Scheduling
The DEA has scheduled a scattering of fentanyl-related substances individually through
administrative rulemaking.89 Of course, the DEA can continue to schedule fentanyl analogues
this way.90 The DEA can also regulate controlled substance analogues using the analogue
provisions under 21 U.S.C. § 813 and definitions under 21 U.S.C. § 802 (32), but the process of
prosecuting these cases and getting a court to declare a substance as an analogue is time and

86

Forbes, 806 F. Supp. 232 (D. Colo. 1992) (finding that since alphamethyltryptamine (AET) is

a primary amine and dimethyltryptamine (DMT) and diethyltryptamine (DET) are tertiary
amines, DMT and DET are not chemical analogues of AET).
87

Id.

88

21 C.F.R. § 1308.11(a); compare 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11(e). 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11(h)(i).

89

21 C.F.R. § 1308.11.

90

See supra note 10.
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resource intensive.91 The reduced prosecutorial burden under the temporary order, according to
law enforcement, is effective in reducing the number of new chemical variations of fentanyl in
the illicit market.92 The DEA may have the authority to permanently schedule the class of
fentanyl analogues if Congress does not do so, but HHS must first perform an eight-factor
analysis of, presumably, the entire class of fentanyl analogues.93
Maintaining the order does not align with the DEA’s obligations under the CSA to
evaluate substances based on their medical value and potential for abuse. Class-wide scheduling
of fentanyl includes thousands of substances, some of them not even realized yet. Fentanyl
analogues are not unilaterally harmful — chemical structure does not automatically predict
likelihood of abuse or addiction.94 Some of the fentanyl analogues that fall under the umbrella of

91

Beth Schwartzapfel, Biden Could Have Taken the War on Drugs Down a Notch. He Didn’t.,

THE MARSHALL PROJECT (June 16, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/. See
LAMPE, supra note 57; LAMPE, supra note 63.
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Victor W. Weedn, et al., Fentanyl-related Substance Scheduling as an Effective Drug Control

Strategy, WILEY ONLINE LIBRARY, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/15564029.14712.
93

See supra note 10 at 16.
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Comer et al., Potential Unintended Consequences of Class-Wide Drug Scheduling Based on

Chemical Structure: A Cautionary Tale for Fentanyl-Related Compounds, 221 DRUG AND
ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 1, 3 (April 2021) (stating that the “main problem with class-wide bans is
that potentially thousands of compounds are defined solely by their chemical structures without
regard for their pharmacological activity. As such, an antagonist (i.e., a medication that could be

21

this class scheduling order may not actually be harmful or have the same psychogenic effect as
fentanyl. Designation as a schedule I substance means that the substance has no medical or
therapeutic use, which may not be the case for all fentanyl compounds.95 Licit fentanyl can be a
lifesaving medical drug and is unique in serving the needs of patients in extreme
circumstances.96 Critics argue that fentanyl analogues will remain illegal under the Controlled
Substances Act even if they are not permanently placed into Schedule I or II.97
Critics of the class-wide order further argue that since it lowers the prosecutorial burden
of proof, it will result in unfair outcomes for criminal defendants.98 Class-wide scheduling could
impose mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenders where the substance in question is not
necessarily harmful, which some classify as overcriminalization akin to other policies born out of
an ongoing war on drugs.99

used to reverse an overdose but would not produce a drug “high”) could be mistakenly included
in the class-wide ban”).
95

See LAMPE, supra note 56, at 3.
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See Stanley supra note 42.
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Ronald Newman & Aamra Ahmad, Vote “No” on H.R. 2630, Extending the Temporary

Emergency Scheduling of Fentanyl Analogues Act, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (April 20,
2021), https://www.aclu.org/.
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Supra note 40 at 58.
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As of December 2020, only eight individuals were prosecuted under the temporary scheduling

order. Id. Groups Urge US to End Emergency Scheduling of Fentanyl-related Substances,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (April 8, 2021), https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/08/groups-urge-us-
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Many scholars, scientists, and activists have criticized legislative and administrative
scheduling, asserting that kratom, psilocybin, marijuana, and other substances previously placed
in Schedule I have medical benefits that ought to render them, at most severe, Schedule II
substances.100 Many of these substances may provide promising alternatives to opioid analgesics
for pain management or addiction treatment.101 Maintaining the thin rope of this temporary
scheduling order serves to further delegitimize both the legislative and administrative scheduling
processes. Establishing more robust, transparent, and defensible methodologies for making
schedule determinations will restore trust between the DEA, HHS, the American public, and the
scientific community. More importantly, subjecting the decision to judicial review preserves the
system of checks and balances that the framers intended.

end-emergency-scheduling-fentanyl-related-substances#. See also 167 Cong. Rec. H2025,
H2027 (April 21, 2021) (statement by Ms. Jackson Lee, Representative from Texas).
100

American Kratom Association: HHS Rescinds Scheduling Recommendation for Kratom But

FDA Failed to Notify the Public for 2 ½ Years, PRNEWSWIRE (Jan. 28, 2021),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/american-kratom-association-hhs-rescindsscheduling-recommendation-for-kratom-but-fda-failed-to-notify-the-public-for-2--years301217770.html; Jack E. Henningfield, et al., The Abuse Potential of Kratom According to the 8
Factors of the Controlled Substances Act: Implications for Regulation and Research, 235
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 573; Matthew W. Johnson, et al., The Abuse Potential of Medical
Psilocybin According to the 8 Factors of the Controlled Substances Act, 142
NEUROPHARMACOLOGY 143; Hudack & Wallace supra note 75.
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See Castillo, supra note 69, at 977-984.
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II.

Regulatory Barriers to Opioid Use Disorder Treatments
Maintenance treatment; or the practice of supplementing a harmful, addictive substance

with a less-harmful, less-addictive one; has a complex history in the United States. Over the last
several decades, the medical community has driven the effort to destigmatize medical
maintenance treatment, citing its life-changing effectiveness.102
Methadone is a synthetic opioid agonist classified as a Schedule II substance.103 It is
effective both in treating chronic pain and in treating opioid addiction.104 Unlike heroin,
morphine, and fentanyl, methadone is slow-acting and does not produce euphoric affects.105
Methadone’s slow-release property is the key to its success, allowing users to avoid withdrawal

102

Sarah E. Wakeman, et al., Comparative Effectiveness of Different Treatment Pathways for

Opioid Use Disorder, JAMA NETWORK OPEN (Feb. 5, 2020),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2760032; Study Highlights
Effectiveness of Methadone and Buprenorphine, NAT’L INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE (Feb. 28,
2020), https://www.drugabuse.gov/news-events/science-highlight/study-highlights-effectivenessmethadone-buprenorphine; Methadone and Buprenorphine Reduce Risk of Death After Opioid
Overdose, NAT’L INSTITUTE OF HEALTH (June 19, 2018), https://www.nih.gov/newsevents/news-releases/methadone-buprenorphine-reduce-risk-death-after-opioid-overdose.
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21 C.F.R. § 1308.12(c)(15).
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See Marisa Crane, Side Effects and Long-Term Effects of Methadone, AMERICAN ADDICTION

CENTERS (last updated Nov. 25, 2019), https://americanaddictioncenters.org/methadoneaddiction/side-effects.
105

Id.
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and reintegrate into society, leading relatively normal lives.106 However, users can abuse or
become dependent on methadone and a methadone overdose is lethal.107 At the height of its
distribution in the United States, methadone was responsible for 30% of all overdose deaths.108
Buprenorphine is a Schedule III substance.109 It is a partial opioid agonist, meaning that
when it binds to mu opioid receptors, it causes a lesser conformational change and therefore a
lesser depressive effect on the central nervous system.110 In full agonists, as dosage increases,
the analgesic affect increases, but this is not the case for partial agonists. In partial agonists, as
dosage increases, the analgesic effect of the drug begins to plateau.111 For this reason,
buprenorphine and other partial agonists are less lethal than other opioid substances.112 A highly
successful medication for opioid use disorder is Suboxone, which is a combination of

106

Pros and Cons of Methadone, AMERICAN ADDICTION CENTERS (last updated Feb. 3, 2020),

https://americanaddictioncenters.org/methadone-addiction/pros-cons.
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Id.
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Christopher M. Jones, et al., Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Trends in

Methadone Distribution for Pain Treatment, Methadone Diversion, and Overdose Deaths, 65 n.
26 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 667 (2016).
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Deborah Sontag, Addiction Treatment with a Dark Side, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2013),
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buprenorphine and naloxone.113 Naloxone works as an opioid antagonist, so the common
combination of the two substances, Suboxone, works as both a maintenance and detoxification
drug.114 A study of MAT found that buprenorphine was significantly less lethal than methadone
and that methadone patients remained in treatment for approximately twice as long as
buprenorphine patients.115
A. Legislative History Surrounding Medically Assisted Treatments
The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (CDAPCA), which
included the CSA, was the first legislative attempt to address the opioid crisis from an
administrative and regulatory perspective,116 but the Narcotic Addict Treatment Act of 1974
(NATA) created an annual registration process associated with opioid treatment programs and
medically assisted treatment.117 The purpose of NATA was to “reach the common goal of
making a modality of treatment available to those narcotic addicts for whom it is deemed

113

See Wakeman, et al., supra note 102.
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Treatment, RECOVERY RESCH. INSTITUTE, https://www.recoveryanswers.org/researchpost/suboxone-mortality/.
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Id.
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Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1234.
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Pub. L. No. 93-281, 88 Stat. 124-25. See also Statutes, Regulations, and Guidelines,

SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN. (last updated June 24, 2021),
https://www.samhsa.gov/medication-assisted-treatment/statutes-regulations-guidelines.
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appropriate while further limiting diversion of drugs to illicit channels.”118 NATA was born in
response to growing concerns about rising rates of diversion from methadone programs as a
result of both negligence and intentional exploitation, or “unscrupulous practitioners.”119 It
established the Attorney General’s authority to grant and suspend registrations for opioid
treatment programs.120 SAMHSA is responsible for certifying opioid treatment programs and
issuing standards for treatment.121
The Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000 (DATA Act) created the “DATA waiver,” an
avenue through which physicians meeting certain criteria could treat OUD with Schedule III, IV,
or V substances (buprenorphine) outside of an OTP.122 The purpose of the DATA Act was “to
allow qualified physicians…to prescribe schedules IV and V antiaddiction medications in their

118

Regulation of Methadone and Other Narcotic Drugs in Treatment Programs, Hearing before

the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93rd Cong. 14-15, (June 18, 27, 1973)
(statement of Jerome H. Jaffe, Director, Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention).
119

Id. at 22 (statement of John E. Ingersoll, Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous

Drugs). See also id. at 89 (statement of Mr. Rogers, expressing concern that methadone and
heroin are one in the same).
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Children’s Health Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-310, 114 Stat. 1101 (2000) (Title XXXV is

known as the DATA Act).
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offices without an additional drug enforcement registration if certain conditions [were] met,”123
and Congress recognized that NATA had created a barrier to these treatments for patients
without access to opioid treatment programs.124 Congress noted the difference between
buprenorphine and methadone with respect to abuse potential and buprenorphine’s promising
treatment effectiveness.125 The DATA Act limited waivered physicians or practice groups to a
small number of patients per year.126 It granted the HHS Secretary authority to adjust the patient
limit and add to the conditions for waiver.127 In 2001, SAMHSA issued final regulations that
created the regulatory system of accrediting opioid treatment programs.128 In 2003, SAMSHA
authorized OTPs to prescribe and dispense buprenorphine.129 In 2008, the DEA changed the
DATA waiver to apply to individual practitioners instead of practicing groups, meaning that
individual qualified professionals could treat up to thirty patients in a year.130
The Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 (CARA) extended the scope of
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The Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 1999, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Health and

Environment of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 2 (1999) (statement of Sen. Orrin
Hatch from Utah).
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Id. at 9 (prepared statement of Sen. Carl Levin from Michigan).
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77 Fed. Reg. 72752, 72753 (Dec. 6, 2012).
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73 Fed. Reg. 29685 (May 22, 2008); 21 C.F.R. § 1301.
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DATA waivers, temporarily increasing the types of practitioners authorized to administer or
dispense maintenance and detoxification treatments in Schedule III, IV, or V under DATA 2000
to include nurse practitioners and physician assistants.131 CARA increased the maximum
number of patients permitted per practitioner from 30 to 100 annually.132 HHS issued a final rule
in 2016 creating a third tier maximum of 275 patients for practitioners under 42 CFR 8.6108.655; practitioners previously eligible to treat 100 patients could now treat up to 275.133 The
Substance Use Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for Patients
and Communities Act of 2018 (SUPPORT Act) of 2018 expanded the scope of the DATA
waiver even further.134

131

Pub. L. 114-198, 133 Stat. 695 (2016); 42 C.F.R. § 8 (implementing the CARA). See also

Karin E. Johnson, et al., The Effects of the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016
on Nurse Practitioner and Physician Assistant Buprenorphine Prescribing in Medicaid, HEALTH
AFFAIRS (Nov. 6, 2019) (describing the consequences of the CARA Act, noting that it resulted in
increased prescription of buprenorphine among nurse practitioners and physician assistants),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20191105.242580/full/.
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Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-198, 133 Stat. 695

(2016).
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Medication Assisted Treatment for Opioid Use Disorders, 81 Fed. Reg. 17639 (Mar. 30,

2016); Summary: Major Components of the HHS Final Rule, AM. SOC. ADDICTION MEDICINE
(July 6, 2016), https://www.asam.org/.
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B. Recent Developments
In the eleventh hour of the Trump administration and the dawn of the Biden
administration, HHS issued guidelines to expand patient access to buprenorphine.135 The
guidelines exempt practitioners from X-waiver certification requirements outlined in 21 U.S.C. §
823(g)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) of the CSA, allowing them to treat up to thirty patients. The HHS Secretary
determined that these training requirements served as barriers to OUD treatments.136
For the first time, physicians and other qualified practitioners can obtain X-waivers
without fulfilling the requirements originally intended to supplement the expertise and
capabilities of opioid treatment programs. DEA registration requirements and patient limits

a “DATA-waiver” and treat up to 100 patients with MAT. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 823(g)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
The SUPPORT Act set forth additional conditions under which practitioners could obtain DATA
waivers and expanded Medicaid coverage for MAT. Eligible physicians needed eight hours of
training and other providers were required to complete 24 hours of “qualifying training.” All
eligible providers had to prove capacity to provide counseling and ancillary services. It also
removed the thirty-patient limit that would otherwise exist during a “waivered” practitioner’s
first year of administering MAT. The SUPPORT Act allowed certain providers to treat 275
patients after one year of MAT.
135

Practice Guidelines for the Administration of Buprenorphine for Treating Opioid Use

Disorder, 86 Fed. Reg. 22439 (issued in January 2021, rolled back by the Biden administration,
and reinstated in April 2021).
136

Id. at 22440. See also Hugo Hanson, Lisa’s Legacy: How the Buprenorphine X-Waiver Costs

Lives, FILTER (Aug. 20, 2019), https://filtermag.org/buprenorphine-x-waiver-costs-lives.
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remain for practitioners treating thirty patients. The new guidelines also allow practitioners
meeting the previous X-waiver criteria to treat up to 100 patients, as opposed to thirty, in their
first year of administering MAT. The guidelines apply to X-waiver medications, like
buprenorphine (Schedule III), but not methadone (Schedule II), which still must be dispensed by
a SAMHSA certified narcotic treatment program with a valid DEA registration.137
The DATA Waiver has evolved considerably since it came into existence in 2000.
HHS’s authority to determine practitioner eligibility for waiver in administering MAT for OUD
is statutory allows the HHS Secretary to “issue regulations (through notice-and-comment
rulemaking) or practice guidelines to address… additional exemptions from the requirements.”138
Where previous expansions of the DATA-waiver were made through notice-and-comment
rulemaking or acts of Congress,139 this recent expansion of the X-waiver occurred via issuance of
agency guidance.140
Furthermore, this expansion constitutes a de facto removal of the training requirement
where it previously existed to provide an alternative means for non-DEA registered practitioners
to administer potentially diversion and abuse-prone drugs. Removing the waiver requirement
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42 C.F.R. § 8.11.
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70 Fed. Reg. 36338 (June 23, 2005); 73 Fed. Reg. 29685 (May 22, 2008); 77 Fed. Reg. 72752

(Dec. 6, 2012).
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See supra note 135. See also Richard A. Epstein, The Role of Guidances in Modern

Administrative Procedure: The Case for De Novo Review, 8 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 47, 61
(discussing the controversial nature of the administrative “interpretive rule”).
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essentially removes the OTP requirement for buprenorphine altogether. The guidelines still
require non-physician qualified practitioners to administer the MAT under supervision of a
DEA-registered physician in a treatment setting.141 The training and psychosocial services
requirement exists based on the assumption that medical professionals outside of an OTP have
lesser knowledge of OUD treatments and diversion prevention142 and the antiquated notion that
MAT for OUD must be strictly regulated.143 The recent guidelines directly oppose these
premises, reasoning that because buprenorphine poses such a minimal risk of overdose and
diversion, it can and should be prescribed or administered by any willing medical professional.
C. Predicted Outcomes of the Relaxed X-Waiver Requirements
These new practice guidelines will likely increase the number of dispensers and

141

This schedule III substance can now be dispensed by any qualifying professional that registers

with the DEA See supra note 135 at 22440.
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See Medication Assisted Treatment for Opioid Use Disorders, 81 Fed. Reg. 44711, 44713.

Ironically, many practitioners do not prescribe buprenorphine and similar drugs due to lack of
training. See Erin J. Stringfellow, et al., Removing The X-Waiver Is One Small Step Toward
Increasing Treatment of Opioid Use Disorder, But Great Leaps Are Needed, HEALTH AFFAIRS
(April 22, 2021), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20210419.311749/full.
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S3, S3-S5 (2003).
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prescribers of buprenorphine.144 Recent history demonstrates the impact of permitting
physicians to prescribe buprenorphine without additional training;145 this practice has been legal
in France since 1995.146 When France legalized physician prescription of buprenorphine in
1995, 1 in 5 primary care providers prescribed buprenorphine, almost 50% of heroin users were
treated with buprenorphine, heroin use declined, and overdose mortality fell 79%.147 However,
abuse of buprenorphine and methadone increased dramatically and deaths from buprenorphine
overdose, while rare, did occur.148 Buprenorphine itself has abuse potential,149 so expanding the
scope of the DATA waiver (X-waiver) will likely contribute to the risk of diversion.150 In
France, overdose mortality declined despite the introduction of buprenorphine into the illicit

144
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TREATMENT 108214.
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market because buprenorphine was, in essence, the lesser of two evils.151 The X-waiver
requirements are not likely the greatest barrier to buprenorphine treatment,152 but their removal is
a positive step in expanding access. Without any change in the OTP requirement, the X-waiver
changes will not improve OUD patients’ access to methadone.153
III.

Deregulation of Telemedicine and Telemedical Prescriptions Related to Opioid Use
Disorder Medically Assisted Treatments
Within the first several months of the COVID-19 pandemic, government agencies

recognized that patients’ access to non-COVID-related medical care would be severely impacted.
The DEA declared a public health emergency in response to the pandemic, triggering an
emergency exception provision of the CSA.154 SAMHSA and the DEA issued several
publications temporarily expanding the scope of telemedical services for purposes of treating
opioid use disorder.155
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A. Legislative History of Controlled Substances and the Internet
The Ryan Haight Online Consumer Protection Act of 2008 (Ryan Haight Act) amended
the CSA, narrowing the ability of practitioners to prescribe controlled substances via
telecommunication.156 This legislation developed in response to public concerns about
pharmaceutical drug diversion on the internet after teenager Ryan Haight purchased prescription
drugs from an online pharmacy and died from an overdose.157 The purpose of the Ryan Haight
Act is to prevent the illegal “delivery, distribution, or dispensing” of controlled substances via
the internet.158 In stating the need for this legislation, Congress explained that “‘rogue sites’. . .
engage in the illegal practices of distributing controlled substances without prescriptions or using
a truncated prescription process so flawed that medical authorities reject it.”159 The Act provides
that to issue a valid prescription of a controlled substance, a practitioner must perform an in-
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person physical evaluation.160 The Ryan Haight Act serves as a barrier to adequate access to
healthcare for individuals seeking medically assisted treatment for opioid use disorder.161
The Ryan Haight Act includes some exceptions under which the DEA may authorize the
prescription of controlled substances through telemedicine. The act allows the DEA to grant
exceptions to the rule, at their discretion, by issuing special registrations to medical practitioners
“[demonstrating] a legitimate need for the special registration” insofar as they are within the
limits imposed by diversion prevention measures and overall “consistent with the public health
and safety.”162 The DEA has not yet utilized this discretionary power.163 The act also permits
the DEA to grant these exceptions during a public health emergency.164
When the HHS Secretary declared the COVID-19 pandemic a public health emergency in
January 2020,165 it gave the DEA the statutory authority to remove obstacles to practitioners in
leveraging telemedicine to prescribe MATs.166
B. New Flexibilities in Initiating Medically Assisted Treatment
Under the Ryan Haight Act, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
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Administration (SAMHSA) requires opioid treatment programs to evaluate patients in person
before issuing buprenorphine, methadone, or directly dispensing the substances.167 However, in
January 2020, SAMHSA cited its statutory authority to remove the “in person” initiation
requirement for buprenorphine due to the “extraordinary circumstances” presented by the
COVID-19 pandemic.168 Under SAMHSA’s guidelines, a practitioner, including DATA-waived
practitioners, may initiate medically assisted treatments with buprenorphine following
telemedicine evaluations, but these must include “two-way, interactive audio-visual
communication” or communication via telephone.169 Of course, all prescriptions issued under
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the new guidelines must be issued for “a legitimate medical purpose” under the CSA170 and
otherwise comply with all other laws surrounding the prescription of MATs. The DEA issued
complimentary guidance supporting these changes.171 However, this change did not apply to
medically assisted treatment with methadone, nor did it remove license and DEA requirements
for practitioners.172
C. New Flexibilities in Treating Existing Patients
“Take-home” medicine regulations, while important for preventing diversion and
overdose of certain substances, limit the logistical benefits of telehealth care by forcing patients
to pick up prescriptions at pharmacies or OTPs. Limitations on take-home medications for OUD
patients became impractical given the pandemic environment.173 The January 2020 emergency
provisions from SAMHSA—and subsequently, the DEA—granted a temporary emergency
exception to allow providers to continue administering controlled substances, including
buprenorphine and methadone, to current OTP patients via telemedicine.174 SAMHSA allowed
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“stable patients” to take twenty-eight days of medicine home and “less stable patients” to take
fourteen days of medicine home, essentially expanding the practitioner’s discretion to make
these determinations.175
D. Analysis of Legal Authorities
These public health emergency provisions are set to expire when the COVID-19
pandemic ends, but many healthcare professionals, politicians, and activists are pressuring the
DEA to maintain these provisions for the benefit of OUD patients.176 Several states are looking
to pass legislation that would permanently remove regulatory barriers for medical professionals
to treat patients via telemedicine and expand Medicaid coverage for telehealth services.177
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The pandemic effectively catalyzed the issuance of these emergency exemptions, but the
DEA had the legal authority to implement the changes before the pandemic. The HHS Secretary
under the Trump administration declared the opioid crisis a public health emergency in 2017.178
The DEA could have implemented these emergency provisions under the public health
emergency exception as it applies to the opioid crisis in general and the DEA can maintain the
provisions now under the same exception, especially considering the recent uptick in fentanyl
and other opioid overdoses.179 If an administration makes a public health emergency declaration
but refuses or simply fails to fulfill the obligations that underly the declaration, then the
declaration is nothing more than an instrument of political posturing.
The Ryan Haight Act offers other exceptions that grant SAMHSA and the DEA authority
to allow practitioners to use telemedicine to perform medical evaluations to prescribe controlled
substances in special circumstances, regardless of whether a public health emergency exists.180
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Specifically, law defines the “practice of telemedicine” to include remote treatment in
accordance with “applicable Federal and State laws…which is being conducted under any other
circumstances with the Attorney General and the [HHS] Secretary have jointly… determined to
be consistent with effective controls against diversion and otherwise consistent with the public
health and safety.”181 Issuing joint regulations would make the current allowances for DATAwaived practitioners permanent.182 Telehealth providers who establish relationships with their
patients over the telephone or via a videoconference, and can perform an adequate evaluation
through this channel, deserve to exist in a separate category from “rogue sites.”183
In addition, the DEA has the legal authority to create a special registration program for
telemedicine practitioners wishing to prescribe buprenorphine.184 Since the Special Registration
for Telemedicine Act of 2018 (SRTA), a chapter of the SUPPORT Act, required the DEA to
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create specific rules to launch the special registration program, the DEA is legally obligated to do
so.185 The Act specified that the DEA was to generate the regulations within one year.186
Through SRTA, Congress expressed intent to expand patients’ access to telemedicine in
response to a shortage in mental health care providers.187 While the DEA has not yet issued
these regulations, it still has an opportunity to design the regulations in a manner that responds
adequately to the needs of patients relying on telehealth for maintenance or detoxification
treatment.
IV.

Recommendation
Our government agencies are responsible for implementing and enforcing the law. The

DEA and HHS alone do not have the authority to permanently schedule an entire class of
fentanyl analogues.188 However, these agencies do have the authority to benefit the population
of Americans affected by opioid use disorder by lessening regulatory obstacles to medically
assisted treatment.
A. Fentanyl
History has proven that the government is ineffective in curbing rates of substance abuse.
Substance abuse, like other behavioral disorders, is, in large part, a cultural symptom: sometimes
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an act of nihilism and despair.189 Substance abuse is also largely supply-driven. The United
States government has succeeded in plateauing rates of abuse and overdose of certain substances
by limiting their supply.190 Despite many efforts to prevent synthetic opioids from falling into
the hands of the American public, synthetic opioid-related deaths have continued to rise.191
Placing fentanyl-related substances in Schedule I and to create a threat of harsher punishment
can only go so far in preventing drug traffickers from bringing fentanyl into the United States.
The FDA and HHS have incredible discretion in drug scheduling and their decisions have
far reaching effects.192 However, the DEA does not have the authority to schedule an entire class
of substances because the required administrative process entails testing and making
determinations about individual substances.193 It is not feasible for the DEA to continue in a
struggle to predict which new modified of fentanyl analogue will enter the illicit market next.
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The administrative process of scheduling is not designed for entire classes of substances.
If Congress believes, based on a reconciliation of the three major factors—potential for
abuse or dependence, medical utility or benefit, lethality, and the cost of failing to schedule the
substances—then as the representative body of the American people it should perform the
bioethical analysis that may ultimately place fentanyl-related substances into Schedule I.
However, should Congress decide to schedule all fentanyl-related substances under
Schedule I, it must consider the broad nature of this prospective legislation and attempt to
address the “unintended consequences” of class-wide scheduling legislation.194 If Congress does
this, then the temporary scheduling order will end, and the decision will be subject to judicial
review,195 enabling courts to address the constitutionality of class-wide scheduling.
Expediting research of fentanyl analogues and rescheduling improperly scheduled
substances is of the utmost importance in preserving the scientific legitimacy of drug scheduling.
In order to prevent the legislation from restricting vital research,196 Congress should task the
DEA with expediting the process and lowering the transaction costs of obtaining the necessary
registration to research fentanyl-related substances. For example, the DEA could increase the
volume of schedule I substances that may be used for research purposes, especially those that
have been proven to treat pain and addiction, including cannabis, ibogaine, and psychedelics.197
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Lethality, both short-term and long-term, ought to be the most heavily weighted factor in
schedule determination if the intent of these regulations is to protect consumer health.
The fact that the DEA is overwhelmed by the volume of fentanyl-related substances
should not prevent it from petitioning HHS to perform a scientific evaluation of these substances.
There is no doubt fentanyl is here in the United States, and a single kilogram of it has the
potential to cause 500,000 overdose deaths.198 Even if class-wide scheduling prevents the rise of
new fentanyl analogues, it will not likely prevent existing illicit channels from operating. Apart
from preventing fentanyl from entering the United States, federal agencies must continue to
address the other side of the fight by diminishing the demand for fentanyl and fentanyl-related
substances by treating opioid addicts.
B. Buprenorphine
The DEA should initiate rulemaking procedures to permit all licensed, registered
physicians to prescribe buprenorphine under the regular registration process for administering
controlled substances. It is difficult, even without these barriers, to motivate addicts to seek
treatment for their addiction and to identify practitioners willing and able to prescribe
buprenorphine.199 Doctors, pharmacists, and mid-level practitioners are required to obtain
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licenses to dispense controlled substances, including Schedule III substances like buprenorphine,
regardless of whether they are being used for opioid use disorder treatment or not.200
Buprenorphine is not a substance with a high likelihood of abuse and diversion.201 The
inevitable diversion of some partial agonists is better than allowing addicts to fall victim to
counterfeit pills laced with fentanyl. The French government has succeeded wildly in reducing
rates of overdose by deregulating less lethal buprenorphine.
The Controlled Substance Act provides the authority for the DEA and SAMHSA to
remove the OTP requirement and its related waiver requirement altogether.202 While the intent
of the DATA Act was not to eliminate the OTP requirement, but to supplement it under “very
careful conditions,” Congress has made a clear effort over the last two decades to relax these
conditions for the prescription of buprenorphine.203 The DATA Act explicitly permits the
Attorney General and HHS Secretary to exempt practitioners from the conditions required to
obtain the waiver.204
As previously noted, this change does not affect the administration of methadone.205 All
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evidence demonstrates that the existing OTP requirement for the provision of methadone is
appropriate given its risk of diversion, abuse, and overdose.206 In France, it was the increase in
buprenorphine prescriptions that rescued users from the high-risk alternative of methadone
treatment.207 However, methadone is an essential tool for allowing OUD patients to reintegrate
and participate socially and the OTP requirement limits patient access to methadone.208
Therefore, as the following section discusses, the DEA and SAMHSA must make an effort to
broaden the definition of “qualified program” to account for advancements in technology and the
increasing needs of marginalized communities.209
When the DEA and HHS regulate substances differently solely on the basis of whether
they are used as painkillers or as maintenance and detoxification treatments, this stigmatizes the
condition of substance dependence itself. Federal agencies must recognize opioid addiction as
the life-threatening behavioral disorder that it is in order to shed the vestiges of historical stigma
against opioid users.
C. Telehealth Expansions for Treating Opioid Use Disorder
Over the last decade, the American public has gained awareness of the disparate impact
of the opioid crisis on low-income and rural communities and the cost of the opioid crisis in
general. The DEA and HHS have failed to exercise their respective authorities under existing
legislation to meet the evolving needs of these communities and the evolving threat that haunts
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them. The DEA and SAMHSA should not rescind the measures that they implemented to
mitigate the “extraordinary circumstances” of the pandemic, the extraordinary circumstances of
the opioid crisis are sufficiently dire.210
The DEA should maintain its exemption for practitioners from the in-person requirement
under 21 U.S.C. § 802(54)(D). Telehealth removes many transaction costs for patients,
expanding the reach of the few healthcare providers willing and able to prescribe substances like
buprenorphine. This would not mandate the prescription of buprenorphine over the internet or
telephone, but it would give practitioners the option to do so, exercising their own professional
judgment in how to best evaluate and treat their patients. One factor preventing doctors from
abusing this flexibility is fear of liability for medical malpractice.211 The current exemption only
applies to substances that a practitioner is registered to prescribe.212 Since X-waivered
practitioners can prescribe buprenorphine and not methadone, for example, the exemption will
not permit them to prescribe methadone via telemedicine. The DEA should also fulfill its legal
obligation under SRTA to create a special registration program for telehealth providers.213
SAMHSA should revisit its opioid treatment program requirements under 21 C.F.R §
8.12 to account for advancements in telemedicine in defining opioid treatment standards.
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Because new telehealth technology is emerging, “take-home” use of controlled substances may
not necessarily be unsupervised use; telemedicine can allow practitioners to adequately observe
patients and has been proven to improve medicine adherence.214 SAMHSA should also change
its “take-home” guidelines to account for buprenorphine’s low lethality and diversion risk by
raising the maximum number of buprenorphine doses that patients may possess for selfadministration. SAMHSA and DEA should continue to explore other avenues of approach in
expanding the physical reach of opioid use disorder treatment by reexamining its OTP and OTP
registration requirements.215
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Conclusion
The battle against opioid use disorder in the United States is evolving. On one side,
synthetic opioids are dominating the illicit market and increasing the lethality of the disorder.
Maintaining the DEA’s temporary class-wide scheduling order on fentanyl analogues is not a
proper exercise of the agency’s authority. The DEA can and should make an effort to expedite
research of fentanyl analogues in order to schedule them properly, but ultimately Congress must
balance the costs of class-wide scheduling against the benefit of disincentivizing illicit
manufacturers from creating new synthetic opioids.
On the other side, modern medicine and advancing technology show promise in
increasing patients’ access to treatment when government gets out of the way. Use of
buprenorphine produces positive results in curbing addiction and it poses only a very slight risk
of overdose. The recent loosening of X-waiver requirements is an encouraging but insufficient
step in expanding availability of buprenorphine; allowing all licensed physicians to prescribe the
substance, as France did, would be more appropriate, especially given the low associated risk
and the high associated reward. In addition, agencies must adapt their regulations to
accommodate the technological strides in medicine that have arisen in response to the market
that demands them. Upholding emergency provisions to deregulate telemedical opioid treatment
is appropriate given the ongoing emergency of the opioid crisis; the DEA can further
acknowledge the urgency of the situation by creating the new telemedicine regulations that
Congress tasked it with creating years ago. In this way, government agencies can reflect our
modern understanding of addiction and the cruciality of these health services.
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